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a b s t r a c t
This paper explains how and why the Matching Auctions work better with Imperfect Financial
Markets. We show that an efficient outsider can obtain a ‘‘good’’ project even if the insider has
informational advantage.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
It is commonpractice that local and state governments prefer to
give local businesses advantage over outsiders with the intention
to ensure the best service and support the local economy.
Procedures like Matching Auctions or a right of first refusal are
common.1 However, local businesses are better informed about
local projects which creates asymmetry between insiders and
outsiders. The consequence is that the outsiders are tamer in
bidding, if at all, knowing that theywill get business from the locals
if they bid too high and will suffer from theWinner’s Curse.2 If they
bid less than the project can promise, then the locals will match
such a bid.
Interestingly, the current difficult financial times can actually
help efficient outsiders to obtain local businesses from inefficient
local companies. In this paper, we present a simple model which
shows that the effect of Imperfect Financial Markets – when local
companies have problems obtaining enough funds to match an
outsider’s bid – can outweigh theWinner’s Curse effect.
There are three main factors in the model. First, the probability
that the project is ‘‘good’’ has to be high enough. Since both the
∗ Tel.: +44 1524 593865; fax: +44 1524 594244.
E-mail address: alexander.matros@gmail.com.
1 For Matching Auctions, see Riley and Samuelson (1981); for the right of first
refusal, see Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996).
2 More about Winner’s Curse can be found in Thaler (1988, 1992).
0165-1765/$ – see front matter© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.128outsider and the insider have asymmetric information, in order to
make a bid the outsider has to be confident enough that the project
is ‘‘good.’’ Then, the cost of making a bid has to be low enough. If
the cost is very high, the project may not compensate for it. Finally,
financial markets have to be imperfect. This means that for one
reason or another the insider sometimes cannot afford matching
the outsider’s bid even if he wants to. If financial markets are
perfect, the outsider gets only ‘‘bad’’ projects (adverse selection),
and therefore does not make a bid because of theWinner’s Curse.
One of the applications of the model is in takeovers, in
which one of the bidders knows the value of the object and
the other bidders do not.3 The well-known result is that the
outcomes of standard auctions are highly sensitive to small
asymmetries between bidders in (almost) common value settings.
Many examples show that the bidder who knows the value gets
an object at a low price because of the Winner’s Curse (see Glaxo’s
takeover bid for theWellcomeDrugs company in Klemperer (1998,
p. 763) and Huizenga matched bid for the Miami Dolphins football
team in Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996, pp. 174–175), among
others). The crucial assumption is that the financial markets are
perfect. However, if a bidder knows the value but cannot borrow
money for matching the current bid, the outcome of such an
3 For the Takeover games, see Bazerman and Samuelson (1983), Holt and
Sherman (1994), Charness and Levin (2009) among others. Note that the markets
are perfect in the Takeover game.
A. Matros / Economics Letters 115 (2012) 500–503 501auction may be quite different from the prediction of the theory
based on the assumption that financial markets are perfect.
2. The model: Matching Auction
Suppose that there are two risk-neutral buyers: Insider and
Outsider in the Matching Auction. The seller has an object for sale
and uses the following procedure: first, the Outsider submits a bid.
Then the Insider observes this bid and can match it. If the Insider
matches the bid, he obtains the object for the matched price. If the
Insider does not match the bid, the Outsider obtains the object for
the submitted price.
Suppose that the value of the object can be either ‘‘bad’’ or
‘‘good’’ and the Insider’s values in these cases are 0 or 1, and the
efficient Outsider obtains values 0, or (1+ α) in these cases, where
α ≥ 0.We assume that the Insider knows the value and theOutsider
only knows that the value is ‘‘good’’ with probability 0 ≤ q ≤ 1,
and ‘‘bad’’ with probability 1− q.
We assume that financial markets are imperfect and the Insider
may have a problem with matching an outside bid. The Outsider
knows that if her bid, t , is in the interval (0, 1], the Insider cannot
match it (even if the Insider wants to) with probability 0 ≤ F (t) ≤
1, because of imperfection in financial markets.
We assume that the Insider will match the outside bid if the
object is ‘‘good’’ and the Insider can afford it (this happens with
probability 1− F (t)). If the Insider does not match the outside bid,
the Outsider gets the object.
The Outsider faces the following problem: she loses bid t if the
object is ‘‘bad,’’ which happens with probability 1 − q. However,
the Outsider can get the ‘‘good’’ object and obtain ((1+ α)− t) if
the Insider cannot afford tomatch bid t . It happenswith probability
qF (t). Finally, theOutsider’s bidwill bematched by the Insider’s bid
if the object is ‘‘good’’ and the Insider can afford it. In other words,
the Outsider’smaximization problem is
max
t∈[0,1]
u (t, q, α, c) = max
t∈[0,1]
{(1− q) (−t − c)+ qF (t)




u (t, q, c, α) = max
t∈[0,1]
{− (1− q) t
+ q {F (t) ((1+ α)− t)} − c} , (1)
where c ≥ 0 is the cost of making a bid. Note that the Insider will
match the Outsider’s bid if the object is ‘‘good’’ with probability
q (1− F (t)) and the Outsider’s payoff will be equal to −c. If the
Outsider does not make a bid, her payoff is zero.
The optimal bid t must satisfy the Outsider’s individual
rationality constraint:
t = t∗, if u t∗, q, α, c > 0,
0, if u

t∗, q, α, c
 ≤ 0, (2)
where t∗ is a solution of themaximization problem (1).We assume
that if t∗ > 0 and u (t∗, q, c, α) = 0, the Outsider does not make a
bid and has 0 payoff. We will write that the optimal bid is zero in
this case,t = 0. We will also assume that it is not optimal for the
Outsider to win for sure by bidding t = 1:
u (1, q, α, c) = q (1+ α)− 1− c < 0,
or
α <
1+ c − q
q
.3. Analysis
There are three key factors which make the Matching Auction
work: (a) the imperfection in financial markets, (b) a high
probability that the object is ‘‘good’’, and (c) a low cost of making
a bid. We consider these factors in turn.
3.1. Imperfect financial markets
Financial markets are imperfect if borrowing money is a
problem. The imperfection in financial markets is a decisive
factor in overcoming the Winner’s Curse problem in the Matching
Auction. Suppose that the financial markets are perfect, or F (t) =
0 for any t ∈ [0, 1]. This means that the Insider not only knows
the value of the object, but can also match any bid if he wants to.
Then, the only optimal choice for the Outsider is to make a zero
bid,t = 0, because she can only win a ‘‘bad’’ object. This is a
typical situation in takeover games. See, for example, Bazerman
and Samuelson (1983) and Charness and Levin (2009).
Further, we will assume financial markets to be imperfect.
Formally,
0 ≤ F (t) ≤ 1, F (0) = 0, F (1) = 1, and
F ′ (t) = f (t) > 0 for t ∈ [0, 1] .
3.2. A ‘‘good’’ object
The first order condition for problem (1) is
− (1− q)+ qf (t) ((1+ α)− t)− qF (t) = 0, (3)
where f = F ′ is the density function.
The second order condition for problem (1) is
((1+ α)− t) f ′ (t)− 2f (t) ≤ 0. (4)
The solution of Eq. (3), t∗, which satisfies (4), depends on the
distribution function F , efficiency parameter α, and the probability
that the object is ‘‘good’’, q. First, we show that t∗ is an increasing
function of q and α.
Proposition 1. ∂t
∗








 = − (1− q)+ qf t∗ (1+ α)− t∗− qF t∗ .













= − 1+ f (t
∗) ((1+ α)− t∗)− F (t∗)









= − qf (t
∗)
q [f ′ (t∗) ((1+ α)− t∗)− 2f (t∗)] .








Proposition 1 is intuitive: if the Outsider is more efficient, α1 >
α2, or more confident that the object is ‘‘good’’, q1 > q2, then she
is ready to bid more, t∗1 > t
∗
2 , in order to increase her winning
chances. The following result is a corollary of this proposition.
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. The next important observation is as follows.
Proposition 3. u (t, q, α, c) is a continuous, non-decreasing func-
tion of q and α. Moreover, ift > 0, then u (t, q, α, c) is an increasing
function of q and α.
Proof. We have
du (t (q, α) , q, α, c)
dq




+ ∂u (t, q, α, c)
∂q
= ∂u (t, q, α, c)
∂q
and
du (t (q, α) , q, α, c)
dα




+ ∂u (t, q, α, c)
∂α
= ∂u (t, q, α, c)
∂α
from the Envelop Theorem. Therefore,
du (t (q, α) , q, α, c)
dq
= t∗ + F t∗ (1+ α)− t∗ ≥ 0
and
du (t (q, α) , q, α, c)
dα
= qF t∗ ≥ 0. 
If the Outsider doubts the type of the object, she faces the risk of
paying a positive bid for nothing. What is the highest probability q
such that the Outsider does notmake a bid independently from the
value of c? If q is the highest probability that the object is ‘‘good’’,
such thatt = 0 for any c ≥ 0, it must be the case that condition
(2) becomes binding for c = 0:
u (t, q, α, 0) = 0,
because u (t, q, c) is a decreasing function of c . Denote q the







, q, α, 0
 = 0.
Such q exists, because u(t∗ (1, α) , 1, α, 0) > 0, u(t∗ (0, α) , 0,
α, 0) = 0, and Proposition 3. It is remarkable that if q ≤ q, the
Outsider is not ready to make a positive bid: she must be confident
enough that the object is ‘‘good’’, otherwise there is no point in
making a bid. The following example illustrates how the optimal
bid depends on q for the fixed zero cost of making an offer, c = 0.
Example 1. Suppose that c = 0, α = 1, and F (t) = t on
the interval [0, 1]. Then the density function is f (t) = 1. Eq. (3)
becomes
− (1− q)+ q (2− t)− qt = 0. (5)
The second order condition (4) always holds. A solution of Eq. (5),










t = t∗ (1, 1) = 1 and q = 1/3.
Fig. 1 shows how the optimal bid depends on the probability that
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t
Fig. 1. The optimal bid of α = 1.
3.3. A low cost of making an offer
The last important factor is the cost of making an offer. It is
obvious that if the cost, c , is very high the Outsider will never make
a bid. What is the lowest cost of making a bid, c , such that the
Outsider never makes an offer? The value c determines a boundary
on the cost of making a positive bid: for any cost c ∈ [0, c) there
will be values of q such that the Outsider makes a positive bid
t∗ (q, α) > 0. We will call c the lowest cost of not making a bid.
If c is the lowest cost level, such thatt = 0 for any q ∈
[0, 1], then it must be the case that condition (2) becomes binding
for q = 1:
u

t, 1, α, c
 = 0,





(1+ α)− t = c.
Note that
(1+ α)− t f t = F t , (6)
from the first order condition (3), if q = 1. We can rewrite Eq. (6)
in the following way






σ (t) ≡ f (t) /F (t)
is the reverse hazard rate. We can now state the following result.
Proposition 4. If σ (t) is a decreasing function, such that σ (0) >










Proof. The fact that σ (t) is a decreasing function, such that
σ (0) > 1/ (1+ α), ensures that (7) has a unique solution as
the intersection of the increasing function t and the decreasing
function (1+ α)− 1
σ(t) . Denote this solution by t .
In order to prove the proposition, we have to check whether
the second order condition (4) holds and the Outsider ’s individual
rationality constraint (2) is binding.
First we show that the second order condition (4) holds. If σ (t)
is a decreasing function, then σ ′ (t) < 0, or
σ ′ (t) = f
′ (t) F (t)− f 2 (t)
F 2 (t)
< 0
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f ′ (t) F (t) < f 2 (t) .
Therefore









 − 2f t
= f t (1+ α)− t σ t− 2 .










= −f t ≤ 0,
which means that the second order condition (4) holds and t is
indeed the maximum.
















and note that condition (8) holds for any c ∈ [0, c). 
Denote v (q) ≡ [u (t∗ (q) , q, α, c)+ c]. Function v (q) is a con-





Proposition 3. Moreover, v

q
 = 0, v (q) > 0 for q ∈ q, 1,and v (1) = c > 0. This means that for any c ∈ [0, c] there exists
q (c), such that v (q (c)) = c.
Nowwe can state themain result: theOutsider makes a positive
bid in the Matching Auction if financial markets are imperfect; the
cost of making an offer, c , is less than the critical level c; and the
probability that the object is ‘‘good’’ is higher than q (c).
Theorem 5. If σ (t) is a decreasing function, such that σ (0) >
1/ (1+ α), then for any c < c there exists q (c) > q such that the
optimal bid ist = t∗ > 0 for all q ∈ (q (c) , 1], where t∗ satisfies (3)
and (4).
Proof. If c ≤ c , then there exists q (c), such that v (q (c)) = c and
v (q) > c for any q ∈ (q (c) , 1], from Propositions 3 and 4. 
Note that, unlike the Takeover games, the optimal bid in the
Matching Auction is different from the Insider object values 0 or
1. Imperfect financial markets are responsible for this difference.
It will be interesting to test the results of this paper in the
experimental laboratory.
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